15 – 15.30 : Coffee (paid by UB)
Carlota Serrahima, ‘Sensory fields: The visual and the bodily,’ is out in Philosophical Studies!
Our workshop ‘Agency, bodily perception, and the self’ is coming up soon! Let us know if you would like to attend: firstname.lastname@example.org …
Poster with the schedule is here:
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
Host: Rethinking Conscious Agency project (ERC Starting Grant 757698), University of Barcelona
Workshop: in-person, Barcelona, April 28-29
Theme: The architecture of skilled action
Lilian O’Brien (Helsinki)
Thor Grünbaum (Copenhagen)
Elisabeth Pacherie (Jean Nicod)
Myrto Mylopoulos (Carleton)
We welcome abstracts (up to 500 words) on a range of topics related to skilled action: control, habit, motor cognition, intention, know-how, the phenomenology of agency, perceptual guidance, etc. To help people plan, accepted submissions should be transformed into 20 minute talks. Send abstracts to email@example.com – please put ‘Architecture of skilled action’ in the subject line.
Deadline: Feb. 22
Covid Note: It is possible that the evolving pandemic will necessitate the cancellation of this workshop, or a late switch to Zoom. We are predicting that this will not be the case.
Workshop on Agency, Bodily Perception, and the Self
ERC funded project Rethinking Conscious Agency (ReConAg 757698)
Logos Research Group in Analytic Philosophy
Hybrid, May 26 & 27, 2022
The body, and the states by which we perceive the body ‘from the inside’ (somatosensory states), are tied to action in a very intimate way. This workshop aims to cover various aspects of the overlap between bodily perception and bodily action, and to discuss the impact of this overlap for our first-personal notion of ourselves as embodied agents.
We invite submissions on the following, and related, topics and questions:
– Some somatosensory states rely on bodily action. One of these states is haptic touch, in which we actively explore objects with our body. Touch has been said to contribute significantly to our consciousness of ourselves as embodied subjects. How much of this contribution is due to the action component of haptic touch? Another of these states is proprioception, namely the perception of bodily position and movement ‘from the inside’. How much do our experience of ourselves as agents, and our knowledge of action, depend on proprioception?
– Some bodily states elicit immediate bodily action. For instance, thirst elicits drinking, hunger elicits eating, and pain may elicit protection of the painful body part. To what extent are this sort of actions, commanded by the body, intentional actions? What is the importance of this sort of actions for our experience of ourselves as embodied agents?
– A lot of our bodily actions are bodily-directed actions: dealing with our bodies is an essential part of what we are doing when we are doing them. Self-directed touch, or protective behaviour, are bodily-directed actions types. How much, if at all, do bodily-directed actions contribute to our awareness of the distinction between ourselves and other agents?
Keynote speakers will be Frédérique de Vignemont and Matthew Fulkerson.
We invite submissions for 40 minute presentations (with 20 minute discussions). Submissions should consist in 500 word abstracts with a title. Please send your abstracts to firstname.lastname@example.org by February 7, 2022(included).
Registration and attendance
The workshop will take place both physically, in Barcelona, and online. Attendance is free in both modalities. However, if you intend to attend, please let us know, so that we can count you in for organizational purposes or send you the link to the virtual room in due time.
For any inquiries, please write to email@example.com
For all details, visit https://rethinking-agency.org
Check also https://twitter.com/ERC_Conscious
New project publication! Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency:
We expect the talks to run about 1.5 hours, with 45 for talks and 45 for Q&A. E-mail Josh at firstname.lastname@example.org for zoom details
Antonia Peacocke (Stanford)
Practical Concepts and Practical Knowledge
11 am EST
Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock (Georgia State)
Know-how and generality: a new argument for intellectualism
10 am EST
Katsunori Miyahara (Hokkaido)
Perspective-sharing in skilled performance: Riken no ken (離見の見) and situated normativity
**This talk will be pre-recorded and sent via e-mail. We will meet to discuss.**
9 am EST
Laura Tomlinson (Colgate)
The Knowledge Condition on Intentional Action
11 am EST
Aaron Henry (U of British Columbia)
Making mistakes with defective attention
12 pm EST
Hosted via Zoom on September 14, 2020 (e-mail email@example.com for access)
March 26, at the University of Barcelona
Speakers: Denis Buehler (Jean Nicod), Lilian O’Brien (Helsinki)
The project’s first publication, Intelligent Action Guidance and the Use of Mixed Representational Formats, to appear in Synthese. Here’s the abstract:
My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes.